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1. Introduction
In the second half of the 16th century, the large nation-wide domestic public debt was 
created in Castile4. The debt to GDP ratio exceeded fifty percent according to some 
estimates, and the ratio between interest service and tax revenues at the end of the 
century was about fifty percent, as in England or France two centuries later5. These 
impressive numbers were achieved without the efficient centralized administration and 
the capital markets that supported the fiscal policies of other countries in later centuries. 
How could this performance be achieved then? The answer to this question requires a 
general analysis of the fiscal system of King Philip II of Spain, which is the purpose of 
the present paper. 
Philip II, as head of the first modern super-power, managed a budget of a scale that had 
not been seen since the height of the Roman Empire6. No country before had faced such 
extraordinary fluctuations and imbalances, both in revenues and expenditures and both 
in times and places. Large military expenses were necessitated by the politics of Europe 
and the first revolution in military technology. The variability in expenses was met by 
large public borrowings up to modern levels, a historical innovation that, in later 
centuries, would be followed by the Netherlands, France and England. As in 18th 
century England, but at an earlier stage of the development of capital markets, Castile 
drew its military supremacy from its superior ability to mobilize large resources through 
borrowing. 
                                                
4 Castile represented about 80 % of today's Spain. 
 
5 At the end of 1792, the service of the English debt was 9.2 million pounds sterling (Grellier, 1810). Tax 
revenues in 1790 were 17.51 million (Mathias and O'Brien, 1976). In the last budget of the Ancien 
Régime that was established by Loménie de Brienne (Compte Général, 1789), the service of the debt is 50 
percent of revenues, but the interest service is smaller since a large fraction of the debt was in life 
annuities. In Castile, the service of the long-term public debt consumed 46% of government revenues in 
1598.  
 
6 At 6 million ducats (the average around 1560), with a ducat at 35 grams of silver, it amounted to 210 
tons of silver per year with a population of about 5 million while the Roman empire's budget was between 
500 and 1000 tons for a population of 50 million (Hopkins, 1995). The size of the budget per capita had 
been very small throughout the Middle Age in Western Europe (Bean, 1973). 
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Compared with other European countries, Philip II faced four additional challenges: (i) 
a large fraction of revenues was subject to independent shocks on the mining and 
transfer of silver from the Americas; (ii) the majority of expenditures were abroad; (iii) 
capital markets had not yet developed into centralized places with daily trading (as 
would be seen in Amsterdam or London); (iv) most importantly, the central government 
had no direct control over a large part of the tax administration7, and had to negotiate 
with the eighteen cities that represented the Spanish Realm and administered the main 
taxes. 
The adjustments to short-term shocks on the budget were first met by short-term loans. 
As in 18th century England, financial transactions, transfers and debt issuances were 
managed by “moneyed men”, here mainly Genoese bankers, who were in the unique 
position to handle triangular transactions between Castile, Italy and Flanders. An 
accumulation of the short-term shocks would imply a permanent shock that was met by 
issuing long-term debt. Following the routine of the previous century (Andrés Díaz, 
2003), the Crown converted any significant accumulation of the short-term debt into 
long-term domestic debt. Short-term debt that was not collateralized by long-term debt 
never exceeded ten percent of the total public debt. Yet Philip II suspended payments on 
the short-term debt four times. These “defaults” have attracted a large literature that has 
taken explicitly or implicitly the view of a modern government with a centralized 
budget. That view is historically erroneous and cannot account for the credibility of the 
debt of Philip II and the suspensions of payments. 
We present two arguments in this paper. The main one follows a sequence: the short-
term debt could not be credible (and therefore exist) without the possibility of its 
conversion into long-term debt; the credibility of the long-term debt required funding 
through credible tax revenues, which, in turn, required the alignment between the debt 
holders and the people in charge of establishing the taxes that would service that debt; 
in the historical and political context of Castile8, that alignment was achieved by the 
                                                
7 Such an administration began in England just before the Glorious Revolution (Brewer, 1988), and in 
France under Bonaparte. 
 
8 The alignment of tax collectors and debt holders has been critical for the credibility of large levels of the 
public debt in all centuries. The issue is discussed in the advice of Saint-Simon to the Regent in 1715. 
Stasavage (2000) argues that an important factor in the decrease of the borrowing cost in 18th century 
England was the administration of the Whigs in which the annuity holders controlled the taxes. See also 
Epstein (2000). 
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decentralization of the debt and the taxes through the intermediation of the eighteen 
cities that were represented in the Cortes; the level of taxes for debt services put a 
ceiling on the debt service that had to be negotiated by central bargaining in the Cortes; 
delays in these negotiations blocked the entire system of debt financing and triggered all 
the suspensions of payment on the short-term debt. 
That argument implies that the long-term borrowing capability of the Crown was 
enhanced by its lack of control of the taxes. The system was in effect a generalization of 
the public debt in Italian city-states. The long-term debt would have been less credible 
and entail a higher cost if the Crown had been in charge of these taxes. Indeed, the 
interest rate on the domestic debt decreased during the century despite the large 
borrowings.  
This system generated three crises because of imperfect information and divergent 
motivations. Each of the three crises occurred when the service of the long-term debt 
reached the ceiling of the tax revenues that had previously been agreed upon by the 
cities in the Cortes.  All the previous literature (to be reviewed below) on these crises 
focuses on the negotiations between the Crown and the Genoese bankers. In our 
argument, the main issue was the relation between the Crown and the cities. The first 
two crises (1557 to 1560, and 1575 to 1577), led to an increase of the taxes that could 
be used to service the long-term debt. The resolution of the second and the third crisis 
(1596 to 1597) involved a reduction of the interest rate. 
The second argument of this paper highlights the difference between interest reduction 
and debt reduction. The domestic debt was in perpetual annuities redeemable at par 
(juros al quitar): the Crown could repay the principal of an annuity at any time. That 
feature had been introduced in the 15th century and by the end of that century, the 
Crown had routinely used the redeemability of the annuities to lower their interest rate 
as the market rate decreased gradually over the century. In England, the first interest 
reduction on the entire debt was achieved by Pelham in 1749-1750, after the failure of 
the first attempt in 1737 (Chamley, 2011). In Castile, the interest reductions of the 15th 
and 16th century were not conducted in a centralized capital market and without the 
agreement of a parliament (as in England). Instead, debt instruments were 
heterogeneous because financing was through heterogeneous cities. But each interest 
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reduction was not forced and included the escape clause that the debt holder could take 
the cash payment of the face value of the principal instead of the interest reduction9. 
Interest reductions were conducted during the settlements of crises in 1575-1577 and 
1596-1597. At the same time, some of the debt was reduced. The literature ignores the 
interest reductions that are explicitly stated in the settlements and assume that any lower 
interest payment is a default. That misunderstanding obviously leads to an exaggerated 
evaluation of the “defaults”. Our view is that the haircuts were relatively small. 
The finances of 16th century Spain, and in particular the payment stop of 1575, have 
been the subject of a vast literature. A trendsetting work in the English literature has 
been the article by Lovett (1980) who wrote, “the bankruptcy of 1575 took place 
because the bankers refused to advance any more money and the king, in desperation, 
resumed for his own use the revenues assigned to pay royal debts.” 
Conklin (1998) built his argument on that idea: the Genoese bankers would lend up to a 
ceiling that was determined by the penalty that they could inflict for non-repayment; the 
penalty was the loss of the Netherlands that would follow the stop of the bankers' 
transfers to the Spanish army fighting a rebellion in these provinces. However, there is 
no evidence for the numbers that Conklin alleges as that ceiling (about 8 million 
ducats). Historians have never taken seriously the thesis of Conklin (Carlos Morales, 
2008). 
The present paper differs from the work of Drelichman and Voth on three fundamental 
issues. Drelichman and Voth (2010) view the Castilian government as a modern 
government that is in control of taxes and faces a standard foreign debt problem to 
which they apply International Monetary Fund (IMF) criteria on the long-run level of 
debt to GDP. The present study shows that such a view is not historically accurate. 
Second, we do not link the debt crises to a temporary liquidity problem and the timing 
of silver remittances, as they do. Thirdly, Drelichman and Voth (2011) grossly 
overestimate the haircuts in the settlements of 1577 and 1596 because they ignore the 
redeemability of the domestic debt that enabled the government to legally lower the 
interest rate (as other countries did in later centuries) and proceed as if the credit market 
in Castile was centralized with one interest rate, as in a modern economy. In this paper, 
                                                
9 We will see that the choice was actually between cash repayment of the principal and additional 
payment (crecimiento) on the principal to keep the same annual income. 
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we will bring some evidence on how the market for the domestic government debt 
actually worked in 16th century Castile.  
Needless to say, much more needs to be done, and there is a wealth of documents in 
Simancas that is available. Drelichman and Voth (2011) present computations of the 
rate of return on the loans made by the Genoese bankers under the implicit assumption 
that bankers lent on their own funds. But there is evidence (referenced in this paper) that 
Genoese bankers provided only partial equity for their loans raised funds either in the 
credit market or through the selling of collaterals of their loans. There is also evidence 
that the actual payments on loans deviated from the contracts either at the time of the 
initiation of the loan, or, more important, when a rescheduling took place. Our argument 
reinforces the conclusion of Drelichman and Voth that Genoese bankers made very 
good return on their loans to the Spanish monarchy despite the latter’s alleged 
bankruptcy. However, we think that any attempt to provide more than approximate 
estimates of the rate of return on the funds of the Genoese bankers is, in the current state 
of our knowledge of the actual transactions, a futile exercise. 
Our paper is obviously related to the issue of debt credibility and institutions but that 
literature is too vast to be referenced here. For example, we do not want to discuss 
whether the government of Castile was “fragmented” or “absolutist”. Our purpose, 
instead, is to analyze the remarkable case of the finances of Castile, and to use 
economic rationality as a tool for the interpretation of the archival evidence and the 
previous studies of historians.  
Historians have either specialized on the relations between the Crown and the Cortes 
(Fortea Pérez, 1990), on the relations between the Crown and the bankers (Carlos 
Morales (2008) with the cited literature). We claim that the two are intertwined, 
especially in the most important crisis of 1575-1577. For the data on revenues, we use 
some of the standard references in the literature, with small alterations, and the archives 
in Simancas for information on loans from Genoese bankers and actual payments made 
by the Crown. 
The paper is organized along the lines of the main argument. The instruments of the 
long-term debt are presented in Section 2. The sources of funding that debt are analyzed 
in Section 3; specifically, in relation to their capability to ensure the credibility of the 
long-term debt. We show that the properties of the financial instruments in that debt 
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(market, redeemability) are related to the structure of revenues. Section 4 is devoted to 
the short-term debt in relation to the long-term debt. Section 5 discusses the theory of 
debt policy under the constraint of quantum adjustment of taxation. It is shown that 
some accumulation of short-term debt can be efficient despite its higher cost. That 
accumulation of short-term debt is entirely converted into long-term debt when there is 
a tax adjustment, as actually occurred under Philip II.  In Section 6, each of the three 
crises, 1558-1560, 1575-1577, 1596-1597, is analyzed in view of our main argument. 
The first two led to a significant increase of the domestic taxes to fund the domestic 
debt. In the last two crises, the government applied some interest reductions. We discuss 
such a policy in regard of similar interest reductions in Spain in the previous century 
and in other countries for later centuries. 
2. The long-­‐term debt
The center of the fiscal system of Castile was its long-term debt. Its credibility rested on 
its funding system and that credibility supported the credibility of the short-term debt. 
In order to understand the funding mechanism and the interest reductions on the debt, 
we have to examine the financial instruments of this long-term debt. 
Domestic long-term bonds, called juros, had been introduced in the 12th century as 
pension rewards for services during the Reconquista10. Their marketability increased 
gradually over the centuries. Given the stage of development and the institutions in the 
16th century, there was no central market with price quotations as in centuries later in 
the Netherlands or England, and there could not be one. The juros were serviced at the 
city level to ensure their credibility. Thus, for a juro issued in Sevilla, the coupons had 
to be collected in Sevilla and not in Madrid. The same office would service the juros 
and collect the local sales tax revenues on which the service of juros had first claim. 
Juros were also ranked by local order of seniority according to their date of issuance. 
No default took place on juros in the 16th century, but there could be local delays of 
payment. Juros were traded and not attached to a particular holder (transactions had to 
be registered); furthermore, they were not homogeneous like the 3% or 4% annuity 
found in 18th century England. 
                                                
10 See Toboso (1987), Pérez-Prendes and Torres López (1963), Barthe Porcel (1949). 
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Juros were either perpetual and redeemable annuities (juros al quitar), or life annuities 
(juros de por vida), which were also redeemable. Juros al quitar had been introduced at 
the beginning of the 15th century. A juro al quitar had a face value, the principal, which 
could be paid back by the government at any time. The redeemable feature enabled the 
government to reduce the debt in a time of surplus and, more importantly, to refinance 
when the interest rate decreased. Such interest reductions had taken place in the 15th 
century, from 10 to 7 percent and from 8 to 6 percent. At the same time, the Crown sold 
new juros at rates of 7% and 6% (Andrés Díaz, 2004). Under Philip II, most juros were 
redeemable11. The definition of life annuities (juros de por vida) is less clear at this 
stage. They seem to have had a longer term than the standard life annuities found later 
in other countries, such as France or England. We will show examples of some juros de 
por vida that had a face value at which they were redeemed.  
The redeemability of the perpetual annuities is a central issue in the fiscal policy of 
Castile and needs to be discussed. A helpful reference is the later case of 18th century 
England where, despite a centralized and sophisticated financial market, the government 
faced significant hurdles in lowering the cost of its redeemable debt. English annuities 
were redeemed by one of two methods. In the first method, the budget surplus fed the 
Sinking Fund to refund the annuities at par when the long-term interest rate was lower 
than the rate of the annuity. This method was slow as it reduced the interest on the debt 
by a flow. In the second method, the government converted the whole stock of the debt 
to a debt at a lower interest rate. In order to save on transaction costs, since the holders 
of the new and the old debt were identical, it was more efficient to reduce the interest 
rate on the entire debt, with the provision that annuity holders could opt for cash 
repayment instead of accepting the interest reduction. Such an operation, which should 
have been straightforward in a perfect capital market with competitive agents, created in 
fact a game in which the coordination of annuity holders could induce the failure of the 
interest reduction (Chamley, 2011). Indeed, in 1737, the English government failed in 
its first attempt to reduce the interest rate from 4% to 3%. In 1750, it succeeded, under 
very favorable circumstances, but for the next war ten years later, the English 
government did not issue any redeemable annuity and the next interest reduction on the 
                                                
11 According to Artola (1982), the fraction of juros al quitar was 76% in 1559, 82% in 1575 and about 
90% at the end of the century. 
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entire English debt took place only at the end of the 19th century after an extraordinarily 
long period of low interest rates. 
The events of England in the 18th century illustrate why juros al quitar could not be 
redeemed in toto in 16th century Castile. Two additional features prevented the 
refinancing of the entire debt in Castile. First, as described before, the market for juros 
was fragmented and not centralized (as it had been for a 4% English annuity). Second, 
in the Castilian tradition, the interest on the annuities was not reduced by a decrease of 
the annual income for a fixed face value. The rate reduction was achieved by the 
payment of an increase of capital for a fixed annual income.  
A juro was defined by the capital amount needed to generate 1000 maravedis (mrs 
henceforth). For example, “14.000 al millar” means an interest of 7.14 percent. That 
definition obviously reflects the important motive of a stable rent (juros were 
appreciated by widows and monasteries). An interest reduction was called a crecimiento 
because the holder of the juro was given the choice between either receiving its face 
value in cash, or paying the difference with the new face value. For example, in a 
reduction from 7.14 to 5 percent, the holder of a juro with a rent of 1000 had the choice 
between receiving 14 000 in repayment of the juro, or keeping it and making a one time 
payment of 6000. The juro that had been “increased” bore the new face value which 
would be paid if it were redeemed at a later date. Crecimientos were not forced interest 
reductions because of an escape clause (see an example in the Appendix). 
The very definition of the juros provided a commitment device against a forced 
reduction. When the interest was reduced, the “invariant” was not the principal (as for 
an annuity in 17th century France or 18th century England), but the annual income. 
When the face value is the invariant, it is relatively easy to force a reduction of the 
annual income. But when the invariant is the annual income and the only way to reduce 
the interest rate is to increase the principal, such a forced “reduction” is much more 
difficult to impose on the juro holder. No juro had its annual income reduced during the 
reign of Philip II. All interest reductions were voluntary. The issue will be discussed 
again in the context of the 1575-77 and the 1596-1697 crises.  
In a perfect capital market with competitive agents, interest reductions through dividend 
reductions and capital increases are trivially equivalent. In Castile, a reduction, either 
gradual or in toto, of the interest rate on the long-term debt could have been achieved by 
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a combination of crecimientos and trade with the market prices anticipating the 
probability of crecimientos in a perfect capital market. This context was no more 
relevant in 16th century Castile than in 18th century England. Since the method of the 
crecimiento generated an increase of the capital stock, it had to be applied gradually on 
different juros with different rates that coexisted at the same time. 
3. Funding the juros
The funding of the domestic debt should, above all, have a stable basis. Since the 
existence of public debt, the standard method to increase the credibility of that debt is 
the earmarking of revenues12. In 18th century England, each new bond issue was tied to 
a tax on specific items, typically an excise that was collected by the newly created elite 
administration (Brewer, 1988). In Castile, juros were also defined with respect to their 
funding - however, there was no central control as in the English Parliament.  
 
Table 1 
 
Table 1 presents an overview of the revenues according to their capability for debt 
servicing. There are four parts in the table, each defined by its reliability for the 
servicing of the public debt. 
(i) On the left side, the ordinary revenues provided a stable source of funding. In 
the top part, the fixed contribution of cities provided the most reliable base 
because it was in control of the cities and the service of the juros had first 
claim on these revenues. In the lower part, the taxes that were administered 
directly by the Crown (e.g., import duties, monopolies) were less reliable 
because there was no independent control on their use and they were subject 
to the fluctuations of economic activity. 
(ii) On the right side, the extraordinary revenues were of two types. In the top, the 
contributions of the cities were stable but they had no permanent legal status 
                                                
12 In the US, retirement benefits in the social security system are financed by a special tax and budget. 
The Bush administration failed in its attempt to include the Social Security tax in the general budget 
because of the protests that it would endanger the future benefits. 
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and had to be renewed by voted every few years. Hence, they could ot be 
used to service the long-term debt.  In the lower part, the revenues were 
neither politically nor economically stable. 
Cities and the encabezamientos
Throughout history, the most important feature of a credible public debt (with low 
interest rates) has been the alignment between the debt holders and the people who 
control and enforce the taxes that service the debt. It is therefore not surprising that the 
public debt emerged in the Italian city-states of the High Middle Age with the 
institution of the Monte (Pezzolo, 2008): the government of the city was run by the 
ruling class of the merchant activities that were the “raison d'être” of the city. This class 
and their family relations were at the same time the holders of the city's debt and in 
control of the determination and the administration of the taxes that serviced that debt13. 
What was good for a city-state could also be used by a state that included cities. The 
Italian system was applied to 16th century Castile on a grand scale14. The setting was 
ideal: most of the Castilian realm was represented by eighteen cities, with their 
surrounding regions, and negotiations between the Crown and the Realm were 
centralized in the Cortes. 
The main features of the Castilian fiscal system were formalized in the Cortes of 1536. 
The main tax in Castile was the alcabala (Zabala, 2000), a sales tax with a nominal rate 
of 10 % that acted more like a legal maximum. The actual rate was much lower, 
possibly around 2%15. Before 1536, the tax had been collected both by tax farming and 
lump payments (encabezamiento) guaranteed by cities16. In the Cortes of 1536, the 
system of encabezamientos was generalized to alcabalas in Castile as the 
                                                
13 In the city of Burgos (1650), out of 800 families, 120 holded juros for a total amount of 2 million 
ducats and “all but two or three of them were from the caballero elite which ran the city” (Thompson 
1994, p. 161). 
 
14 In 1522, Francis I introduced that system in order to finance his fight against his arch enemy, Carlos V. 
Francis I issued a loan through the city of Paris (Vührer, 1886). The Rentes sur l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris 
can be considered as the formal start of the public debt in France. 
 
15 See the Appendix and Artola (1982), p. 50. 
 
16 Encabezamiento can be translated as “heading” (of different revenues). It is equivalent to the “bottom 
line”. See Alonso García (2007). 
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encabezamiento general. The amounts of the annual lump-sum payments for each city 
were set for about six years. They were discussed in the Cortes and adopted by majority 
voting. That system provided obvious benefits to all parties17, but it also reinforced the 
asymmetric information between the Crown and the cities, which had an impact on all 
the payments stops of Philip II, as we will see later. The juros had been serviced at the 
local level before 1536, but the encabezamiento provided the most stable basis of the 
servicing of the juros.  
The lack of a central administration to directly collect the alcabalas enhanced the 
borrowing capability of the central government. The delegation of tax revenues and the 
debt service was a commitment device that enabled the Crown to increase the domestic 
debt to a level that was unprecedented in the 16th century.  
Although juros were administered by cities, they were not contracts between holders 
and cities, but between holders and the Crown. They could thus be traded in the entire 
realm with registered sales and transfers. An example is provided in appendix. Because 
of the delegation of revenues collections, there was no centralized market (as in 18th 
century England) and it should not be surprising that the coupon rates for apparently 
similar juros were not identical. However, there was an active market for juros as can 
be verified in the clauses of some financial contracts18. 
Some tax farming was used by cities after 1536, but only when it proved to be a more 
efficient method locally. Cities had an incentive to extract the best quantity of revenues 
through auctions for tax farming in order to reduce the difference from the 
                                                
17 Whether the cities or the central government pushed for the change has been debated in the literature. 
According to Perez Fortea (2009), the central government was the driving force behind the change. Cities 
used the encabezamiento to increase the share of the tax burden toward the region that they controlled 
(Morales García, 1997, p. 127). 
 
18 In the asiento signed with Lorenzo Spinola on December 31, 1572, a clause specifies that some juros 
have to be evaluated according to the market and the evaluation of the market should be  certified by three 
or four other bankers, (AGS, Contaduras Generales, leg. 85-2: Asiento de Lorenzo Spinola, 31/12/1572.). 
There were many other similar examples. 
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encabezamiento that was fixed19. Monitoring and enforcement remained in the control 
of the cities, rather than the Crown20. 
The amounts of the encabezamientos for the cities were determined by centralized 
negotiations among the cities within the meeting of the Cortes. These amounts were 
determined to be at a fixed nominal level for long intervals (see Figure 1). Each 
readjustment of the encabezamiento would require lengthy negotiations and that cost 
imposed some interval of time between these negotiations. During these intervals, the 
real value of the revenues would decrease due to the inflation rate (an average annual 
rate of about 1.3 percent). 
Other ordinary revenues
The central government collected customs and profits from regulated monopolies. As 
the government had no tax administration, and these taxes were collected at specific 
locations (e.g., customs, salt production), it was relatively easy to subcontract their 
collection to local entrepreneurs through tax farming. These revenues were under direct 
control from the central government and thus did not benefit from the special protection 
that was given to the taxes collected by the cities. They provided a base for debt 
funding, but that base was not as stable as the encabezamientos because of the direct 
control by the central government and because of the fluctuations in trade and general 
economic activity.  Accordingly, they supported juros of lesser grade. 
Extraordinary revenues
The extraordinary revenues, on the right of Table 1, could not provide a good source of 
funding for the public long-term debt. Few juros were written on these revenues, at least 
in the 16th century, and they traded at a discount. 
The servicios (with two components, servicio ordinario and servicio extraordinario) 
were similar to the alcabalas. They were administered by the cities and their level was 
                                                
19 The king's representative (corregidor) in Sevilla informed the king of this practice, disapprovingly 
(Fortea, 1990, p. 233, note 93, cited by Morales). 
 
20 The crown had a local controller (receptor real), often a banker or a lender to the crown, to monitor the 
tax revenues. Edward I had done likewise in England when he allowed Riccardi supervisors in the 
customs offices. When he did not need the Riccardi, he fired the supervisors and bankrupted the banking 
family. Genoese bankers were never put in that position because Philip II could not “fire" the cities that 
serviced the juros taken as collaterals for the asientos. 
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determined by centralized negotiations in the Cortes in a bargaining joint with that of 
the alcabalas (see below for 1575). But compared to the alcabalas, the servicios were a 
voluntary contribution of the cities and the duration of the contract was only for three 
years (Carretero 1998, p. 45). They were renewed repeatedly - though cities, hoping to 
keep some room for bargaining, insisted that such renewals were not automatic. Their 
levels were very stable under Philip II but, because of their legal status, they could not 
be used to service the domestic debt, at least until the end of the century. We can 
include in this type of tax the millones that, following the disaster of the Armada, were 
voted for a period of six years and let to expire after that period.  
Other revenues, from the Church and other sources, were too fragile, either politically or 
economically, to fund the debt. The highly variable revenues from the silver trade 
(through a 20% mining tax in America) were large but could not form a stable basis for 
funding. Castile relied on the same method as Edward I in 13th century England when 
wool exports were restricted to specific harbor for better monitoring: Sevilla was the 
unique legal port of entry for American precious metals (essentially silver). The 
revenues from the tax were subject to the uncertainties of production and transportation, 
thus highly variable, making Castile a somewhat unique case before the raw commodity 
exporting economies of the 20th century. 
Between 1560 and 1575, some juros were funded by the revenues of the Casa de la 
Contratación that managed the silver revenues and was directly controlled by the 
Crown (Ruiz Martín, 1965). Not surprisingly, they were traded at a significant discount. 
In this sense, there cannot be a meaningful relation between the revenues of silver and 
the debt service. 
The evolution over time of the different types of revenues is presented in Figure 1. One 
observes the volatility of the silver revenues which were higher on average in the last 
quarter of the century, the step-like revenues of the alcabalas, a gradual increase of all 
other revenues in the first part of the reign and their stagnation afterwards. Because of 
inflation (1.3 % per year), caused by the inflow of silver, real revenues fell toward the 
end of the century. (Revenues deflated by the price level and by population are 
presented in Figure 3.) 
Direct revenues from customs and monopolies are put together under “Farms”. 
Revenues from the Indies are represented in actual numbers by points and, in a 3-year 
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moving average, by a curve. The Millones (to be described later) are included in the 
servicios for the years 1591 to 1596. The variability of the other revenues is illustrated 
by Figure 4. 
 
Figure 1: Revenues 
 
4. The short-­‐term debt and financial contracts
Expenditures (essentially military as in all countries before Waterloo) were driven by 
wars and thus highly variable, with levels that were inflated in the 16th century by the 
revolution in military technology. Since revenues were also affected by the large 
fluctuations of the silver imports, these unprecedented shocks had to be absorbed by 
financial contracts and short-term loans. As for the long-term debt in the previous 
section, the case of 18th century England presents a useful reference since it is well-
documented and it took place when policy faced fewer constraints. 
The English method of debt financing became operational after a long transition that has 
been called a “financial revolution” by Dickson (1967). Dickson and others have 
emphasized that, even after the completion of that transition, the government could not 
issue large quantities of liabilities, both long- and short-term, without the collaboration 
of institutions such as the Bank of England and the South Sea Company, and of skilled 
financiers (the “moneyed men”)21. The task of these agents was greatly facilitated by the 
workings of the centralized financial market in London that was open six days a week. 
We should therefore be aware that the role of financial agents was even more critical in 
16th century Castile. when large financial institutions and a centralized financial market 
did not yet exist. Carlos V had a special relation with the Fuggers. Under Philip II, from 
1561 on, the main players were the Genoese bankers (Ruiz Martin, 1968). They had the 
expertise to handle the complex transactions between Castile, the Netherlands and Italy, 
and within Castile, they operated through letters of exchange and other short-term 
contracts. 
                                                
21 See also Chamley (2011). As a counterexample, the failure of France in the same century to issue 
marketable bonds may be related to the absence of such a class of finance people. Notaries may have been 
partially substituting for financiers. See Hoffman, Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal (2000). 
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The contracts between the Crown and the bankers were called asientos22. They 
specified, with some but not complete details, the payments between the bankers and 
the Crown (e.g., date, place, currency, exchange rate, interest rate). When they included 
loans, the average maturity was about two years – however, some contracts could last 
up to ten years. When the exact dates for repayments were not fixed, the asiento often 
specified an interest rate. In the period of 1570 to 1575, the standard rate was 12 percent 
per annum, with some exceptions. Contrary to some descriptions in the literature 
(Conklin, 1998), the greater share of asientos was not written in loans to pay the army 
in Flanders. Indeed, not all contracts were loans and more than half the contracts 
involved only domestic transactions, which illustrates the role of the Genoese bankers in 
the workings of capital markets within Castile (as the moneyed men would in England 
later). 
Some asientos were collateralized by juros. The collateral had two purposes: first, to be 
a collateral; second, in keeping with the overall fiscal policy model, when the spending 
shocks turned out to be more than transient, the short-term loan had to be converted into 
a long-term loan. The lender could then sell the collateral instead of receiving cash. 
Such a sale should not be taken as a sign of failure from the Crown, but instead as part 
of an efficient overall policy. 
Under Carlos V, the juros as collateral could be sold only if the Crown did not meet the 
terms of the asiento (juros de caución). In 1561, following an initiative of the banker 
Juan Curiel de la Torre, some collaterals were juros de resguardo (al quitar and por de 
vida): the banker could sell such a juro provided that he would return a similar juro if 
the Crown met the payment schedule of the asiento (Ruiz Martin, 1968). In this case, 
the service of the juro that had been sold would be deducted from the liability of the 
Crown. An example is described in the Appendix. The system of the juros de resguardo 
enabled bankers to refinance asientos at a low interest rate23. That system affects the 
                                                
22 These contracts are easily available in the archives of Simancas, set by Philip II himself, nicely stacked 
by year and alphabetical order of bankers. The reading of the originals often provides very useful 
information about financial transactions at that time. For summary statistics of the contracts, see Table 3 
in Drelichman and Voth (2011). 
 
23 When the crown paid back the asiento to the banker, the banker had to return a juro to the crown and 
that juro would naturally be evaluated at par (How could the crown acknowledge in a contract that some 
juros were below par?). The loophole was that the banker did not have to return the same juro. He could 
then buy a carefully chosen juro with low market value to satisfy the obligation to return a juro at par. 
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rate of return on the investment of bankers on their own funds, and therefore invalidates 
the method of Drelichman and Voth (2011) who ignore the financing methods of the 
bankers. 
5. Cycles in the debt policy
In the standard modern theory of public finance, the optimal fiscal policy of a central 
government in a frictionless economy is to minimize tax distortions. Accordingly, the 
debt policy should be driven by the smoothing of taxation: at any time, the announced 
program of future taxes revenues should, by and large, be a constant fraction of output, 
and that fraction should be adjusted to meet the government budget constraint that 
equalizes the present value of the expected future revenues and expenditures, including 
the service of the debt. Any mismatch between the flows of revenues and expenditures 
should be met by increases or decreases of the debt, as for private individuals in their 
saving plans24. England presented a textbook illustration in the 18th century (Barro, 
1987). It also, however, despite being endowed with a centralized government and a 
well-developed modern-like capital market, departed from these principles a number of 
times. 
Borrowings in the second part of the Napoleonic wars were relatively small despite 
higher expenditures because the government had exhausted its borrowing capacity. 
England also made the distinction between the long-term funded and the relatively 
costlier short-term unfunded debt. Short-term debt was used in all the wars. Its level 
was high at the beginning of the 18th century, then was much reduced during the 
“Financial Revolution”, a period that took fifty years between” from 1690 to 1740 
(Dickson, 1967). Short-term debt was allowed to accumulate again during the War of 
American Independence. 
The constraints in Castile 
In Castile, any accumulation of the asientos that was not transitory should be accounted 
for as a permanent liability of the government and therefore be refinanced through the 
                                                                                                                                          
The trick should have fooled no one but could be useful in granting side payments to the bankers for 
special favors or loans. The cities objected to such less-than-transparent deals.  
 
24 See Barro (1979) for a quadratic loss function with uncertainty, and Chamley (1985) for the theory of 
second-best taxation. 
18 
 
long-term debt in juros. That was the core of the fiscal policy of Philip II. However, he 
had to adapt to specific constraints. Compared to the later case of England, the 
government of Philip II faced two types of additional constraints. 
1. No lengthy financial revolution had taken place that could lower the transaction 
costs in long-term debt financing. The juros, although redeemable at par, remained 
less flexible than English annuities. We have described in Section 2 the 
decentralization and the fragmentation of their capital market. 
2. The most important constraint was the absence of a unique government. As 
described in Section 2, the delegation to the cities of the servicing of the funded 
public debt enhanced the credibility of that debt. But that delegation imposed 
constraints on the adjustments of taxation that could not proceed smoothly as in 
18th century England. We now turn to this issue, that is central to our paper. 
In an economy with a central fiscal authority like the Parliament of 18th century 
England, that authority has the available information about future revenue needs. In 
Castile, authority on expenditures was the exclusive domain of the Crown, yet cities that 
were represented in the Cortes had some partial authority on taxation. 
We have seen that the cities collected the most stable funding tax, the sales tax 
(alcabala), and that the amount of these revenues was set through collective bargaining 
in the Cortes. The Cortes could not meet independently like a modern parliament. 
Instead, it had to be called by the Crown. No increase of the encabezamiento could be 
done without a meeting of the Cortes and an agreement of the cities. They did not have 
the power to completely oppose a tax increase, but they could reduce the amount of the 
increase, or delay its implementation for a few years. 
An agreement on the level of ordinary taxes managed by cities effectively imposed a 
ceiling on the service of the domestic debt. Because of the costly negotiations, the taxes 
could be adjusted only at widely separated moments in time and not continuously (as in 
the standard model of optimal fiscal policy). 
The negotiations in the Cortes were affected by two main issues. First, the utilities of 
the expenditures might have differed between the Crown and the cities, that might have 
little interest in the war in Flanders. Second, even if the Crown and cities had agreed on 
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the utilities of expenditures25, they faced a situation of asymmetric information. That 
problem was well known in all feudal countries where the sovereign faced the constraint 
of “evident necessity” and had to justify the taxation (in men or money) for wars. A 
contribution to the solution of the information problem was found in 12th century in the 
Cortes of Aragon26 and the 13th century in England27.  
The debt cycle 
Because of the fixed cost of each renegotiation of the debt service ceiling and the 
asymmetric information, the fiscal policy under Philip II went through debt cycles in 
four phases. In the second half of the 16th century, three such cycles occurred which are 
illustrated by Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Debt service and ordinary taxes 
 
(a). Regular regime 
In the first phase, the service of the juros (situado) is below the ceiling of the ordinary 
revenues and increases gradually over time. There should be no large accumulation of 
the short-term debt except under the prospect of short-term windfall gains in silver 
income. Negative permanent shocks on the budget are absorbed by an increase in the 
long-term domestic debt. This regime applies for some years before 1558, and after the 
settlements of 1560 and 1577.  
(b). Accumulation of asientos 
                                                
25 Under the most favorable circumstances spending would be on a public good (e.g., the glory of the 
country), each city would always have an incentive to bargain more in order to reduce its contribution. 
 
26 As the raison d'être of public finance was the military expenditures, the Reconquista between the 11th 
and the 15th centuries shaped the institutions and the fiscal system that were in place at the beginning of 
the 16th century. Already in the 12th century in northern Spain, fiscal issues were discussed in assemblies 
with a representation of the three orders (Church, nobility and merchants in the third estate). Under the 
legal basis of the fundamental law (“Ley de Ordenamiento”) of 1328, these assemblies evolved into the 
Cortes which in the 16th century, represented only the third estate (“testamento") of the merchants and 
patricians of the cities. The only real purpose of the meetings was the determination of the tax policy. 
 
27 For an analysis of the role of asymmetric information in some clauses of Magna Carta (1215), see 
Green (1993). 
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As the service of the domestic debt nears the ceiling of the ordinary revenues, 
refinancing the asientos through juros becomes more difficult: because of the 
decentralization of the juros, some towns may be up to the revenue constraint before the 
aggregate service reaches the aggregate ordinary revenues. The level of asientos 
increases in that phase which took place before each of the three crises in 1558, 1575 
and 1596. 
(c).  Crisis, payment stop and parallel negotiations with the cities and the bankers 
When the level of asientos has reached some value, the Crown initiates negotiations 
with the cities. At a time that cannot be predicted accurately, by definition, the Crown 
declares a payment stop on all the asientos. The payment stop would not be necessary if 
the cities would easily agree to the increase of the debt service ceiling. In a situation of 
asymmetric information, the payment stop may be a powerful argument to convince the 
cities of the “evident necessity”. The payment stop satisfies also the function of the 
information event in the Townsend (1979) model, as will be discussed below. That 
phase took place in 1557 to 1562, in 1575 to 1577 (but the Crown attempted to raise 
taxes 1573), and in 1596 to 1598. 
(d).  Simultaneous settlements and conversion of all asientos into juros 
Separate settlements with the bankers and the cities end the negotiations. The bankers 
take a haircut in a general agreement (Medio General), while the cities accept higher 
taxes in the settlements of 1560 and 1577. In 1598, taxes are not increased but the 
interest rate is reduced on some juros. However, that settlement should be viewed as a 
prelude to the next negotiations of 1607, as the temporary settlement of 1558 preceded 
that of 1560. A key feature of the settlement is the conversion of all the asientos, net of 
any haircut, into long-term juros. That feature has been neglected in the literature but 
reinforces our interpretation of the debt policy. 
A stylized model of short-term and long-term debt 
The average interest rate on juros was between 7 and 5 percent. The rate on asientos 
was double that, around 12 percent. Before the payment stops of 1557, 1575 and 1596, 
the amounts of outstanding asientos, gross of the collaterals, were 7.5, 15 and 7 million 
ducats, respectively. Why would the Crown let asientos accumulate despite the high 
21 
 
cost? The explanation is the high cost of raising the ordinary revenues for the funding of 
the long-term debt. 
The Crown delayed the tax increase (originally intended to fund the long-term domestic 
debt) and accumulated instead some costly short-term debt. This was done because of 
future discounting, and the probability that a tax increase would not be necessary, 
should the war turn out favorably. Assume the lump sum cost to be C, the discount rate 
per period (a period being a year) to be r, and the probability per period of avoiding the 
tax rate is π. Thus, the gain from delaying another period is (r + π) C. 
The cost of delay is the higher interest rate on the asientos. Let R be the interest rate on 
the asientos, per period, and assume that the discount rate on the juros is the same as the 
discount rate of the Crown, r. If the stock of asientos is equal to a, the cost of delay for 
another period is (R - r) a. The Crown should delay and let asientos accumulate up to a 
level ā such that the marginal cost and benefit from delaying one more period are equal. 
Hence, 
 (R - r) ā = (r + π) C        (1) 
The argument has two implications: 
(i) Whatever the parameters, the Crown should always let some asientos accumulate, 
despite a higher interest rate, before beginning negotiations on a tax increase and the 
debt conversion. That property is due to the fact that from a position of zero asiento, the 
cost of asientos is second order with respect to the time of delay, while the gain from 
delay is of the first order. The cost is second order because of the product of two first 
order terms, the flow of the accumulation of asientos and the flow of the income paid on 
the asientos. 
(ii) The maximum level of asientos in the previous formula depends on the parameters 
of the model. As an example, since the interest rate of the asientos was about twice that 
of the juros, with R = 2r, and assuming a probability of avoiding the tax rate at six 
percent per year, the previous formula becomes 
ā = 2C.          (2) 
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To put numbers in context, suppose that the Crown has accumulated asientos of 5 
million (a plausible estimate for the debt in 1575, net of the juros de resguardo). Under 
the previous formula, that amount would be optimal for a cost of 2.5 million ducats. 
That is not an unreasonable estimate of the cost of the Cortes. It is equal to the increase 
of the alcabalas that was declared by the Crown in September 1474, and not 
implemented by the cities. In this example, the cost of the Cortes is equivalent to a 
postponement of that increase for one year. The negotiations actually lasted three years. 
The suspension of payment to the bankers was a signal to the cities that the Crown 
needed an increase of its ordinary revenues. Each suspension of payments occurred 
when the Crown was negotiating with the Cortes an increase of the cities’ contribution. 
Once negotiations had led to a higher level of ordinary taxation, the Crown had new 
space to increase gradually the level of the long-term debt and to have more collateral 
for asientos. 
In the traditional view among historians and economists, the payment stops were caused 
by liquidity shortages. Such shortage could occur only if the Crown could not sign new 
asientos because of an “excessive” level of short-term debt. If that were the case, which 
is not obvious in the analysis of the 1573 to 1577 crisis below, the Crown should have 
been able to reduce the short-term debt by issuing more long-term debt, as it was doing 
in the phase (a) of the cycle. Our argument is that this possibility was closed to the 
Crown because it was constrained by the ceilings that had been established by the cities. 
The payment stop on the short-term debt was at the same time a consequence of the 
inability to increase the long-term debt and a signal to the negotiating cities to raise their 
contribution. 
6. The debt negotiations and conversions
The service of the long-term debt reached the ceiling imposed by ordinary revenues 
three times during the reign of Philip II. We now analyze these three events in more 
detail. 
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6.1 The first crisis (1557-­‐1560)
The events of 1557 to 1560 have to be considered as a whole, which fits well into the 
general framework that is presented in the previous section. The events were triggered 
by the constraint on the service of the domestic debt. They ended with an increase of 
that ceiling and a complete conversion of asientos into juros. 
At the beginning of his reign in 1556, Philip II inherited from his father, Carlos V, a 
debt of 7.5 million ducats in asientos28. He quite naturally ordered a review of the 
accounts and began negotiations with some bankers to refinance asientos into juros. But 
the service of the debt was reaching the total amount of ordinary revenues, leaving no 
room for more juros (Figure 2). On April 17, 1557, Philip II declared his first payment 
stop from London, where he was spending time with his wife, Mary Tudor, queen of 
England. The suspension affected only the repayments that were due on the asientos but 
not the service of the juros - as for any stop payment of Philip II. 
The decree did not intend to repudiate the debt, even partially. It declared a swap of 
some asientos into juros at 5% - the bankers could sell these on the market29. That swap 
did not apply to the Fuggers who were, at the time, some of the main creditors, and it 
did not address the main problem, which was the ordinary revenue-derived ceiling. The 
second part of the policy was the promulgation on April 30, 1558, by the regent in 
Castile, the princess Doña Juana, of a new tax on the exports of wool. New customs 
were also created between Portugal and Castile on January 30, 1559 (Ulloa, 1977). 
Genoese bankers had accepted the juros at 5% in order to settle the negotiations. 
However, juros at 7.14% were obviously selling faster than juros at 5%. The bankers 
therefore proposed to convert the swap into juros at the rate between 7.14% and 10% in 
the following years while they would grant new asientos. That policy which was 
probably viewed as a stopgap, was initiated by Nicolao de Grimaldo in May 1558 and 
followed by all other bankers between 1558 and 1560. 
                                                
28 Carlos Morales (2008). See also a report in March 1557 (AGS Estado, leg. 121, fol. 61) that is 
referenced by Toboso (1987, p. 115). The computation of the short-term debt is always an approximate. 
Asientos were not traded in a market and the indebtedness on a particular contract at a particular point of 
time depends on assumptions about the interest rates and the exchange rates. There is no such thing as 
“the interest rate”, in today's economies and a fortiori, in the fragmented capital market of Castile. 
 
29 Ruiz Martin (1965) reports that for the year 1552, redeemable juros (47% of all juros) were at 7.14% 
(for a fraction of 47.6%), 5.5% (5.2%), 5% (30%). The remaining 16% paid other rates. 
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The suspension of 1557 and the following negotiations were not concluded by a general 
settlement (Medio General) because each banker settled separately with the Crown. In 
the current state of knowledge, it is doubtful that the first payment stop of Philip II 
generated any default on the asientos. 
When Philip II returned from Flanders to Castile on September 8, 1559, he intended to 
bring the finances of the Crown in order. He summoned the Cortes in Toledo and 
ordered a general review of the budget. The stock of juros was 21.659 million ducats 
with an interest service of 1.5 million (Pulido, 2002, p. 76). The debt in asientos was 4.5 
million (Neri, 1989, p.83), as the 1557 decree had refinanced only some of the short-
term debt. Negotiations would last for the entire year, 1560. On November 14, 1560, the 
king declared his second suspension of payment (always on the asientos). One 
motivation for this payment stop was probably similar to that of the other two stops in 
1575 and 1596: namely, to convince the cities of the “evident necessity” to raise the 
level of taxation. 
Refinancing through funded debt was achieved through the agreement with the 1559-
1560 Cortes that specified an increase of 37% of the alcabalas, effective in 1562. In 
agreement with the model of the previous section, all asientos were converted into 
juros30. There was no Medio General after the payment stops of 1557 and 1560. After 
the settlements, which were made separately between individual bankers and the 
Crown, the signing of new asientos resumed rapidly. In January 1561, a consortium of 
bankers loaned one million ducats to the Crown. The gradual conversion of juros on the 
Casa de la Contratación into juros of higher grade was implemented through contract 
clauses in new asientos (Ulloa, p. 763). From 1562 onwards, juros de resguardo on the 
new alcabalas would be used. 
Between 1562 and 1574, the encabezamiento on the alcabalas was not revised (Figure 
2). Other ordinary revenues increased gradually, because of economic growth and 
because the government extended its revenue base (Figure 2)31, while the debt service 
                                                
30 Because the settlement of the asientos took place in two steps, there is no official document that applies 
to the entire short-term debt. However, there is an indirect proof in the decrees of the payment stops. The 
decree of 1560 applies to the asientos written before 1557 that were not converted in the 1558 settlement 
(Carlos Morales, 2008, p. 85). The decree of 1575 applies to all asientos written since 1560, thus giving 
indirect evidence that asientos written before 1560 had been converted in juros. 
 
31 From 1564 on, the government collected the revenues from the salt monopoly, thus increasing its 
permanent revenues about about 0.2 million ducats (1/6 of the alcabalas). 
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also increase gradually following the model of the previous section. As the revenues of 
ordinary taxes stayed ahead of the debt service, the system worked until the early 1570s. 
6.2 The main crisis (1573-­‐1577)
The crisis of the 1570s was a pivotal moment for the finances of Philip II and has been 
the subject of a number of studies. Most of them focus on the negotiations between the 
Crown and the foreign bankers, and yet this does not provide a convincing explanation, 
as discussed in the introduction. We emphasized in the previous section that center 
stage should instead go to the relations between the Crown and the cities32. 
In the early 1570s, military expenditures increased rapidly both in Flanders and on the 
sea (Battle of Lepanto, 1571). As revenues from the Indies were low during this period 
(Figure 1), the deficit increased. The encabezamiento had been fixed, in nominal terms, 
in 1562. Other ordinary revenues did not increase after 1567, partly because of the 
ongoing war. The service of the debt had now reached a point where it absorbed most of 
the Crown’s ordinary revenues (Figure 2). Following the model described in the 
previous section, the situation called for an increase of tax revenues for the funding of 
the public debt. This required the meetings of the Cortes. The crisis developed in two 
phases. In each of these phases, the Crown faced two fronts: the cities and the bankers. 
Before 1575, the accumulated arrears on the asientos were financed by juros de 
resguardo, some of which were put in circulation. As the service of the juros was on a 
collision course with the stationary level of ordinary revenues (Figure 2), from 1573 
onwards, the Crown pressed the cities for a widening of the tax base. The failure of 
these efforts led the Crown to promulgate the tripling of the alcabalas in the autumn of 
1574. As the cities were in charge of the tax collection, the decree was ineffective33. 
This stalemate between cities and the Crown precipitated the second phase. 
                                                                                                                                          
 
32 For the historical description of the dealings between the Crown and the cities we rely on the reference 
work of Pérez (1990). See also Fortea Pérez (2008). 
33 It is standard in the literature to take the tax increase for granted. There is no evidence that the decree of 
the Crown was applied. Rather, there is evidence to the contrary. Pedro Luis de Torregrosa reported to the 
king in a letter dated on August 4, 1575, that if the increase of the alcabalas would be recovered in 
Toledo by tax farmers—recall that the Crown had no administration--the merchants of that city threatened 
to reduce their trade in that city, thus bringing the tax farmers to bankruptcy (AGS CJH 149). 
 
26 
 
During the first half of 1575, the new asientos were either very short-term or written on 
the promise of an increase of the alcabalas. In the stalemate, the Crown suspended 
payments to the bankers on September 1, 1575 and, in the following month, recalled the 
Cortes. The simultaneous negotiations with the Cortes and the bankers were concluded 
only in November and December 1577, respectively. 
Before 1575: attempts at tax increases and new asientos 
In April 1573, Philip II summoned the Cortes and, as in previous negotiations in 1559, 
proposed a 30-year plan to get rid of the public debt (desempeño) (Fortea Pérez, 1990, 
p. 45): higher taxes would generate a surplus for twenty years and, for the last ten years, 
the burden would be reduced to finish off the remaining debt. Initially, the cities 
accepted the plan’s general idea; however they continued to negotiate through the 
Cortes. No stable agreement could be achieved without the formal approval of all the 
cities. 
While negotiations dragged on, Philip II tried his second plan in December 1573: a new 
flour tax would be created that would be applicable without exemption. The emphasis 
was on an equal share throughout the Spanish realm of the increased tax burden. The 
flour tax, even at a small rate, would have provided a huge extension of the tax base34 
and was strongly resisted by the cities. Indeed, the cities insisted on a commitment to a 
permanent reduction of taxation in the future and to a stop on the sales of offices. 
Furthermore, they were skeptical regarding the Crown’s commitment to a budget 
surplus – a claim no more credible in the 16th century than it would be in the 21th. 
(Discussions between the cities and Philip II were similar to the debates on the budgets 
in some contemporary economies.) The Cortes was suspended at the end of 1573 to 
enable the delegates to return to their cities for consultation. Heated discussions delayed 
the resumption of the Cortes until June 1574. 
Each delegate came back with special ad hoc demands, much like the “pork” in the 
current US congress. There was a further complication in that the taxation of the clergy 
required a papal decree. During the summer of 1574, other issues were discussed such 
as the formal transfer of the juros in quotas to the cities, which would then be free to 
choose how to service or redeem it, or the sharing of the tax burden between the cities. 
                                                
34 The tax could have yielded between three and four million ducats (Fortea Pérez, 2009, footnote 7). 
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The cities were particularly concerned with the unfunded debt of the asientos and the 
role of the Genoese bankers35. The strong popular sentiment against asentistas, similar 
to the reaction today against finance, was used in the following year by Philip II in his 
decreto of payment suspension to the bankers. Unable to find a compromise, the Crown 
took a different strategy. 
The new tax plan of the Crown  
In its first proposals, the Crown may have used the debt reduction as a bait to increase 
taxation. In its new strategy, the Crown did not bother to mention the principle of the 
desempeño although the cities continued to insist on it (Fortea Perez, 1990, p. 73). 
Instead, the Crown noted the increase in recent large expenditures, and the subsequent 
rise in other tax revenues. Yet – it noted – the last forty years had seen only minimal 
increases in the encabezamiento (which had increased by a third in 1562 and left 
untouched in the Cortes of 1570 and 1573). The service of the domestic debt had 
continued to be on a collision course with the ordinary revenues during the protracted 
negotiations. 
On September 20, 1574, Philip II simply tripled the encabezamiento general from 1.2 to 
3.7 million36. The procedure was extraordinary in its timing and the amount of the 
increase. All the previous levels of the encabezamientos in 1536, 1547, 1552 and 1562 
had been determined during meetings with the Cortes. Without the agreement of the 
cities, the tax would could not have been expected to be stable. Instead, it was no doubt 
seen as just another extraordinary levy. Despite the effort of Philip II to employ a 
special task force of “administrators, tax-farmers and public inspectors”37, one doubts 
whether the level specified in the decree of 1574 was actually collected. Thompson 
(YEAR) claims that revenues could even have decreased, in reaction to such an 
unexpected tax increase. Why Philip II insisted on such a large increase is not clear. 
Obviously, a smaller increase would have provided sufficient room for larger debt 
service - as was the case for another ten years after the final settlement of 1577. 
                                                
35 The city of Salamanca instructed its delegates to reject the redemption plan unless a commitment was 
made to throw out of the kingdom all foreigners who dealt with asientos (Fortea Perez, 2009, p. 62). 
 
36 It was expected that a large part of the increase would be an extension of the tax base to bread, wine, 
fruits and agricultural products that had been exempted de facto so far, and that would now be taxed at 
about 4 %. (Fortea Pérez, p. 711990? 2008? 2009?). 
 
37 See Lovett (1985) , p. 31, and Hernández Esteve (1986). 
 
28 
 
Relations with the bankers before September 1575 
During 1574, the new asientos amounted to 6.219 million ducats, close to the record 
level of 1572 (6.248 million ducats). That total included 2.658 million ducats to be paid 
in Flanders, about 3 million ducats in Castile and the rest in Italy (AGS CCGG 86). 
1575 was critical. A complete list of all the asientos signed between January and the 
payment stop is presented in the Appendix. For the eight months before the suspension 
on September 1, 1575, Genoese bankers signed new asientos for 4.8 million ducats, the 
highest amount within such an interval of time. Between March and July, Nicolao de 
Grimaldo made the most important loans, by far, for a total amount of 1.9 million 
ducats. The first ones (1.3 million ducats) provided for disbursements during 1575 and 
repayments by the king during the same year 1575 in three tranches after each 
quatrimestre (37.5 percent for each of the first two)38. The short term of that loan 
(disbursement and repayment would occur within the same year; 1575) shows that 
Grimaldo was prudent. All bankers must have been cognizant of the financial situation 
of the Crown. As moneyed men, they had close ties with the government in Castile. 
Some may even have participated in financial committees of the government. The king 
had tripled the alcabalas. The cities would resist the increase, but the bankers were 
confident that the base for higher taxes was there. Asientos for almost a million ducats 
were written during spring 1575 on the promise for higher alcabalas in 1576 and after. 
The situation is easy to picture in the context of 2010 financial crises of lending to 
Greece. The bankers knew that the situation was risky but they would not have made 
these record loans in spring 1575 if they had anticipated the suspension in September. 
(ii) The payment stop: 1575-77 
Philip II signed the Decreto that put a stop on payments to the Genoese bankers on 
September 1, 1575. There had been discussions of the plan before but the exact date 
may have been chosen to shortly follow the arrival of the fleet39 that came in on August 
11, 1575. The Crown then negotiated in parallel with the towns and the bankers for the 
next two years, until the agreement with the cities in November 1577, and the Medio 
General with the bankers on December 5, 1577. 
                                                
38 See the Appendix. 
 
39 Revenues from the Indies in 1575 were 0.9 million ducats, about half more than the average in the 
previous three years. 
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Negotiations in the Cortes 
The business of the Cortes was to readjust three types of taxes, the encabezamiento of 
the alcabalas, the ordinary and the extraordinary service. The usual sequence was to 
grant first the ordinary and the extraordinary service, and then to bargain on the 
encabezamiento, which was the main item. This time however, the Cortes, in order to 
increase their bargaining power, reversed the order and requested first a reduction of the 
1574 decree (that had tripled the encabezamiento), before voting on the two services. 
Cities were fired by bitter feelings against the bankers and these cities rejected the 
higher taxes – taxes which were perceived as bankers' profits, the more so because of 
the lack of information (Fortea-Perez, 1990). 
Negotiations were very slow. Philip II knew that he had to play a political game with 
the cities that represented the realm and did not follow the facile advice of impatient 
aides to use force. It took almost a year, until August 1576, to agree that the discussion 
on the encabezamiento would take place between the granting of the servicio ordinario 
and the discussion on the servicio extraordinario. That discussion took more than 
another year, until October 29, 1577. In the adjustments of 1547, 1557 and 1567, 
increases had been roughly proportional across cities. For the contract of 1577, 
however, the shares of some cities jumped up: Sevilla from 10.2 percent in 1557 to 17.5 
percent in 1577, Toledo from 5.8 to 7.6 percent. Grenada's share dropped from 9.2 to 5 
percent40. After the parties had finally come to an agreement on the encabezamiento, the 
voting on the servicio extraordinario was sped up and an agreement was reached in the 
following month. 
Negotiations with the bankers 
Could Philip II have avoided the payment stop? A moderate increase of the alcabalas, 
in order to keep up with the growth of the economy, would have been accepted by the 
Cortes and would have secured sufficient space to convert all the asientos into juros. In 
fact, after two years negotiations, such a conversion was eventually done, with a small 
haircut, and without recourse to an immediate increase of the cash inflow. In this sense, 
the payment stop was not caused by a liquidity shortfall. 
All the evidence we have seen points to the use of the payment stop as an instrument by 
Philip II to achieve his goals. The efforts of the previous two years show that he wanted 
                                                
40 See Zabala (2000), Chapter 2 and especially Table 9, p. 64. 
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to reclaim a higher base for funding the debt and that goal was attainable given the 
growth of the economy since the last setting of the alcabalas in 1560 (effective since 
1563). In the context of resentment against the asentistas (similar to the one after the 
2008 crisis), Philip II used the payment stop in September - before the resumption of the 
beginning of the Cortes meeting in November - to show that he was going to be tough 
with the bankers. This also conveyed a signal that the situation was indeed sufficiently 
dire to require a large increase of taxation. 
For the Crown, the payment stop also fulfilled the function of monitoring. The recent 
literature (Townsend, 1979) has emphasized the role of bankruptcy as the outcome of an 
efficient loan contract: the standard debt contract with a fixed interest is efficient 
because it saves on the cost of continuously monitoring the ability of the borrower to 
pay. All the costly monitoring is done at discrete points in time, when the borrower 
cannot meet the contractual payment. In 1575, the case was more complex than that of a 
simple one period debt contract, but the Crown made a special effort during the 1575-
1577 period to review all the asientos that had been signed since the previous 
settlement, and requested the books of the bankers, who refused to comply. The 
bargaining on information delayed the bankruptcy process and increased its cost. 
The sales of the collateral (juros de resguardo) by the bankers, their returns with juros 
of a possibly different type created a confusing situation in which the liabilities of both 
parties would be difficult to determine. This justified the Crown’s claim to review all 
the asientos. The Crown set very soon the principle that it would pay all its debt to the 
bankers. The issue was obviously the amount of the debt. A commission (junta) 
reviewed all the asientos signed since November 14, 1560: 296 contracts with 66 people 
(Nicolao de Grimaldo 35, Lucian Centurion 34, Lorenzo Spinola 32, and so on). The 
balance of each active asiento was bringing past payments to the current date with an 
interest rate of 12%, the rate that was standard in the terms of the contracts (Carlos 
Morales, 2008, p. 164.) 
The Crown and the bankers soon agreed on the amount of 15.2 million ducats, as stated 
in the final settlement. The larger part of the debt was not in unpaid arrears, but in 
repayments that were contractually scheduled for the future. We have examined all the 
asientos that were initiated between 1570 and 1575 (and some before 1570), and 
extracted those that specify contracts after 1575. The total amount of the payments 
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scheduled after 1575 exceeded 12 million ducats. Given the average maturity of these 
remaining liabilities, an approximate estimate of the present value of the scheduled 
repayments is about 10 million ducats. Arrears would then represent about 5 million 
ducats41. 
The terms of the final settlement between the Crown and the bankers had been set in 
March 1577, but it took until the end of the year for the parties to sign. Why the delay? 
A possible interpretation is that bankers may have been looking for a better deal. But 
the timing of the eventual signing provides a more plausible explanation. The document 
of the agreement between the Crown and all the bankers, the Medio General, was 
signed on December 5, 1577, immediately after the Crown had concluded its 
negotiations with the Cortes. That the signature of the agreement between the Crown 
and the bankers had to wait, without significant change, for nine months until the 
conclusion of the Cortes is additional evidence that the payment stop was driven by the 
difficult negotiations between the Crown and the cities. 
The resolution in the Medio General of 1577
The debt of 15.2 million ducats was divided into two parts: 10.4 and 4.8 million ducats, 
respectively42. 
1. The first part, 10.4 million ducats, corresponded to juros de resguardo: 8 million 
ducats were paid by juros de resguardo that had been written at 7.14 percent and were 
reduced to 5 percent. The remaining 2.4 million ducats corresponded to juros written on 
the Casa de la Contratación and were accounted for at their market value, 55 percent of 
the face value. 
2. The second part of the debt, 4.8 million ducats, was divided into two parts. Two-
thirds were paid by juros on salt at the rate of 3.3 percent (30,000 al millar) and the 
other third by juros on rents from the Church and some jurisdictions, at the nominal rate 
of 16.5 and 2.35 percent (16,000 and 42,500 al millar). 
                                                
41 The existence of arrears is also confirmed by the terms of some asientos signed before 1575 that 
included clauses for the payments of arrears. 
42 We use rounded numbers. The Medio General specified exact numbers that can be found in the 
literature (Carlos Morales, 2008). Here, the exact amount is 15,184,464 ducats. 
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We now analyze in more detail each part of the settlement. As shown in the description 
of the juros, the reduction of the interest rate from 7 to 5 percent could not be a default, 
contrary to previous literature that was cited in the introduction. We claim that there 
was no haircut on that first part of the debt. As emphasized previously, credible 
financing of the juros was achieved at the cost of a fragmented credit market. The 
reference to a unique interest rate would be a-historical. Second, the reduction of the 
interest on old juros through the crecimiento implied necessarily the coexistence of 
juros with different interest rates. In 18th century England, annuities at 3% and 4% were 
traded simultaneously. The difference between the prices of these two annuities (traded 
daily) provided estimates of the expectations about the future interest reduction of the 
4% annuities. We have learned43 that in this very sophisticated environment, (i) agents 
treated differently 4% annuities that had been issued in different years, (ii) they 
sometimes seriously underestimated the capacity of the government to reduce the 
interest rate, thus overpricing the 4% annuity with respect to the annuity at 3%. 
The real criterion about the interest rate on juros is the marketability of new juros. Ruiz 
Martin (1968) had provided some evidence of juros at 5 percent that traded during the 
period of 1570 to 1575 for 17,000 al millar, which is equivalent to a rate of 5.88 
percent. In the archives of Simancas, there are numerous documents, still unexplored, 
but possibly in the hundreds, that show sales of juros at 5%, or even lower (see below), 
throughout the 1570s. Consider one example: Bernabé Centurión signed an asientos of 
100,000 ducats in 1572 and was partially repaid by selling juros. These repayments, 
which had not been specified in the contract, illustrate the complexity of the actual 
financial transactions between the bankers and the Crown which were much more 
intricate than the terms of the contracts. Bernabé Centurion received the charge to 
convert juros de por vida paying 14% into juros al quitar at 5%. The first had a face 
value of 7,000 al millar44.  Sixteen juros de por vida were “increased” from 7,000 to 
20,000 al millar, with no change of their annual incomes (6,000 mrs to 115,000 mrs), 
for a total of 528,083. Most of the juros kept the same owner, who paid to the banker 
                                                
43 See Chamley (2011). 
 
44 Juros de por vida were obviously more flexible than simple life annuity on a given head. 
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the difference of 13,000 per 1,000 annual income. Six of them changed ownership 
(AGS CMC 1a época 483-12)45. 
After the signing of the Medio General, the Crown issued a number of orders to specify 
the details of the payments. Special provisions empowered bankers to apply the 
crecimiento to some juros they had sold in order to recover the increment of the face 
value of the juros, along the lines of the transactions conducted by Barnabé Centurion. 
Another example of crecimiento is provided in the Appendix in relation to the next 
crisis of 1596 to 1597. 
On the second part of the debt (4.8 million ducats), the terms of the Medio General do 
not enable us to have a precise evaluation of the terms of the settlement. The rate of the 
juros written on the salt farm was equal to 3.33% (30,000 al millar). There is some 
indication that the “market rate” of such juros was below 5%, but this issue remains to 
be researched in the archives. When we apply the same discount to the other third of the 
debt of 4.8 million ducats, the upper-bound of the haircut of the 1575 short-term debt is 
equal to 1.6 million, that is, 11 percent of the total.  
6.3 The period 1580-­‐1598
The Millones 
The disaster of the Great Armada in the summer of 1588 and the need to rebuild 
provided clear evidence on the revenue needs of the Crown, as mentioned in the account 
of the 1589 Cortes (Jago, 1985)46. The cities quickly granted a special tax increase. It 
was levied like the alcabalas under the encabezamiento, but the cities insisted on the 
specific purpose of the tax, which was given a different name, the servicio de millones. 
This special tax to compensate for the failure of the Great Armada illustrates the role of 
signals in the situation of asymmetric information between the Crown and the cities, as 
during the payment stops in 1557 to 1560 and 1575. Note that contrary to these two 
previous episodes, the Millones were not motivated by the need of the Crown to 
                                                
45 One  “new” owner was the father of the daughter on whom the juro de por vida had been written which 
made good sense from a family point of view. 
 
46 The observability of spending for something as tangible as ships played a role in the development of 
public finance in 18th century England (Brewer, 1988). 
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increase the capacity to convert short-term debt into funded long-term debt. As can be 
seen in Figure 2, the ordinary revenues were well above the debt service in 1590. The 
tax contribution of the cities was clearly meant to deal with the one-time loss of the 
fleet: the Millones were scheduled to last for only six years. 
When the Millones ended in 1596, as scheduled, the service of the long-term debt, 
which had gradually increased since the previous settlement, had reached the level of 
the funding revenues. The contribution of the cities (encabezamiento and servicios) had 
not been adjusted since the 1577 settlement (Figure 2). 
The Crown attempted first a renewal of the Milliones. The cities agreed on July 29, 
1596, to the principle of a new temporary tax. In order to avoid the precedent of a 
straight repetition of the Millones, by the same amount, the new tax bore a different 
name, the cuentos (Fortea Perez, 2009). 
A new agreement that contained specific clauses was signed on February 22, 1597, but, 
by mid-1598, only seven cities had approved the new tax. The Crown had to accept new 
concessions to get the votes of Toledo and Cuenca. A tenth vote was required to get 
majority. The Crown hoped to get it from Segovia. But the agreement was so flawed 
that the government decided to instead withdraw the project, leaving its implementation 
to the next king, Philip III. 
 
The interest reduction in 1596-1598 
As in the previous crisis of 1575, the crisis of 1596 was not caused by a liquidity 
problem. The Millones (1.33 million ducats) ended after 1996, but that negative shock 
on liquidity was more than offset by the record revenues from silver at that time (Figure 
1)47. If the ratio between the service of the long-term debt and the funding revenues had 
been the same as in the early 1590s, no crisis would have occurred. 
The decree was published November 29, 159648. That date was the time reference for 
the later settlement. As in 1575, asientos were contracted immediately before the stop. 
                                                
47 The average of the silver revenues for the years 1591-1594 is 1.225 million ducats. In 1595 and 1596, 
these revenues were 6.2 million and 3.5 million ducats. 
 
48 Ulloa, (1977, p. 820). 
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In September and October, just before the stop, the Crown was negotiating with a 
consortium including Ambrosio Spínola, the Victoria brothers and the Maluenda 
brothers. This negotiation was for a large asiento of 3.6 millions escudos (about 3.9 
million ducats), in twelve equal monthly installments that were to begin at the end of 
November. At the same time, the Crown secretly prepared the payment stop and ordered 
an analysis of all the documents related to the previous decreto in 1575. 
Bankers who had signed asientos in the previous months were taken by surprise (Ulloa, 
1977, p. 821), as in 1575. The short-term debt was now between 7 million and 8 million 
ducats49. All parties had learned from the bitter experience in the 1570s and tried to 
speed up a settlement. As had happened twenty years before, there was much 
resentment in the Cortes against the asentistas and, again, the payment stop may have 
helped them to get some satisfaction. 
The problem of financing the service of the domestic was not resolved by an increase of 
taxation, as in 1560 or 1577, but by a reduction of the interest rate on part of the 
domestic debt. Interest rates on juros had decreased since the previous financial crisis50. 
In the previous crisis, part of juros al quitar at 7.14% were converted in juros 5%. Now 
it was the time to convert juros de por vida at 14% into juros al quitar at 7.14%. 
Asentistas acted as a group in the negotiation. Within a month, they had set up a 
consortium in the form of the Compañía del Medio General. Contrary to 1575, the stop 
was not used as a device to increase ordinary revenues. Economic activity had stopped 
growing since the 1580s - partially explaining the stationary ordinary revenues of the 
Crown (Figure 1). It was probably felt by the Crown and the Cortes that higher 
domestic taxation would be difficult to enforce. The conversion of asientos in juros was 
therefore achieved without change of the tax structure. 
Two-thirds of the short-term debt was thus converted into juros at 5% to be funded on 
available taxes. The remaining third was redeemed by a lowering of the interest rate on 
existing juros51. The operation reduced the interest on 1.5 million ducats and generated 
                                                
49 7 million for San Ayan, and 7.831.251 for Castillo. 
 
50 We have seen that some juros at 5 percent were bought at par in the late seventies. The issue of interest 
reduction on the juros in particular but also in general, has been discussed in Section 2. 
 
51 That part was actually divided itself in 2/3 and 1/3 with the first on juros issued in Castile after 1580 
while the second concerned juros serviced in Castile, Milano and Naples. 
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a service reduction of 75,000 ducats per year. For the interest reduction not to be a 
partial default, but an exercise of the redeemable option by the government, an 
important condition is that individuals have the choice to get the par value of their 
holdings instead of new juros at a lower rate. That provision was explicitly stated in the 
Medio General of 1598. 
The Medio General of 1598
The total debt recognized by the king was 7 million ducats. By and large, asentistas 
acted as a group in the negotiation. Actually, within a month, they set up a consortium 
in form of the Compañía del Medio General. Contrary to 1575, the stop was not used as 
a device to increase ordinary revenues. Economic activity had stopped growing since 
the 1580s, thus explaining the stationary ordinary revenues (Figure 1). The Crown and 
the Cortes probably that higher domestic taxation would be difficult to enforce. The 
conversion of asientos in juros was therefore achieved without change of the tax 
structure. 
Since most of the ordinary revenues were employed to the service of the debt, the new 
juros had to be serviced by extraordinary taxes that were less stable. Two-thirds of the 
asientos were thus converted into juros at 5% to be funded on available taxes (except in 
Naples). The other third was redeemed by the crecimientos of existing juros52. The 
operation reduced the interest on 1.5 million ducats and generated a service reduction of 
75,000 ducats per year. For the interest reduction not to be a partial default, but an 
exercise of the redeemable option by the government, an important condition is that 
individuals have the choice to get the par value of their holdings instead of new juros at 
a lower rate. That provision was explicitly stated in the Medio General of 1598. 
7. Conclusion
The fiscal system of Philip II was much more ingenious than described so far in the 
literature. We have attempted to show how it was adapted to the constraints of its time 
and that its evaluation according to the standards of 21th century economies can lead to 
serious misinterpretations. The main achievement of the government of Philip II was to 
                                                                                                                                          
 
52 That part was actually divided itself in 2/3 and 1/3 with the first on juros issued in Castile after 1580 
while the second concerned juros serviced in Castile, Milano and Naples. 
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mobilize large financial resources through the transformation of his apparent weakness 
in fragmented political and market institutions into a strength for the build up of a 
domestic public debt of a modern magnitude. 
The payment stops of Philip II were not caused by liquidity problems but were part of 
the overall efficiency of the system. We share the point of view Thompson (1994a), 
who is an exception in the literatura, and wrote that the “very periodicity of fiscal crisis” 
was “an integral part of the financial system of the Monarchy” and that “the term 
`bankruptcy’ can be misleading. To apply the expression  “serial defaulter” to Philip II 
is a deception. Although the issue of debt reduction is not the main one in this paper, we 
actually doubt that the payments stops were followed by significant haircuts. 
Preliminary  evidence of the actual dealings between the government (Tesoro General) 
and the bankers shows that what seemed like debt reductions may actually have been 
transactions at prices closed to the market. Many issues in the finances of Castile under 
Philip II, large and small, remained to be examined. For this task, the archives in 
Simancas contain a large amount of information. 
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Appendix 
A case study: issue, secondary market and redemption 
An amount of 2,243,752 maravedís was issued at 7.14% (100=14) in Madrid by the 
General Treasurer of the king, Juan de Lastur to Teresa Núñez, widow of Cristóbal de 
Alcocer and resident of Toledo. The income was therefore of 160,268 maravedíes to be 
serviced at juros on the alcabalas of Murcia that would be issued on July 156553. The 
contract included the right to sell the juros to an institution or to individuals. 
In January 1577, Doña Teresa sold the contract in Toledo to Diego Sánchez 
Ortiz who paid the total principal in silver54. Teresa notified the Crown of the 
transaction, sending a notarized “letter of renunciation”. The new contract was issued 
March 8, 1577, with the same rights as the previous one. Three years later, Diego 
transferred the juros to Gaspar de Valmasea, “regidor” of Toledo who bequeathed them 
in the 1590s to his children from two marriages55. Eventually two of his children bought 
the other's parts and shared the total equally. The juros were eventually redeemed by the 
Crown in 1607 when new juros were issued at the lower rate of 5%. 
                                                
53 40.000 maravedíes on the alcabala of meat, 40.000 on the alcabala of wine and 24.018 maravedíes on 
the alcabala of bread. AHN Consejos Juros, leg. 1733. Folio 7. 
 
54 AGS, Contaduría de mercedes, leg. 227. Copy of the sales act, Toledo, 2/3/1580. 
 
55 AMM, p. 113, Cuadro 1. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Types of revenues 
 
Ordinary Share Extraordinary Share 
Fixed contributions (alcabalas, 
servicios) 
36% Temporary contributions 5% 
    Taxes set by the Crown 25% Other revenues 27% 
  Silver from the Indies 7% 
 
Shares of revenues varied over time and are reported as an indication for the year 1582. 
Negotiations in the Cortes were on the two items of the first line in the table. 
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Table 2: asientos issued in 1575 
 
 Date Banker Ducats   Disbursement  Repayment 
1 08/01/1575 Esteban Lomelin 859 Madrid (feria de octubre 
de 1574) 
En las mismas ferias, en Sevilla, en 
el banco de Pedro de Morga, en la 
venta de villas varias, flotas de 
Indias de 1576, Cruzada de Indias 
de 1575, etc. 
2 09/01/1575 Juan y Pablo Sauri 68 bastimentos y otras 
cosas por valor de 
25.476.975 mrs 
 
3 09/01/1575 Lucian Centurion y 
Agustin Spinola 
79 Madrid en ventas de oficios, algunos en 
1576 
4 01/02/1575 Fucar   Flota de Indias de 1575, 76 y 77 
5 02/02/1575 Bernabé Centurion 103 Italia y Madrid Crecimiento de alcabalas 
6 02/02/1575 Simon Lercaro 61 Milán Crecimiento de alcabalas, 2 y 3 
tercio de 1575 
7 14/02/1575 Juan de Curiel de la Torre 536 Cartagena y Madrid 
(ferias de 1574) 
Feria de agosto de Besançon y 
Chamberi 
8 28/02/1575 Esteban Lercaro y Pablo 
Sauri 
78 galeras España Crecimiento de alcabalas en 1575 
9 01/03/1575 Nicolas de Grimaldo 1.077 Flandes e Italia Alcabalas de 1575 (1 y 2 tercio: 
168.750.000 mrs) 3 tercio 
112.500.000 mrs 
10 02/03/1575 Nicolas de Grimaldo 222 Sicilia (Palermo o 
Messina) 
Alcabalas de 1575, 2 y 3 tercio, la 
mitad en cada tercio 46.875.000 
mrs 
11 04/03/1575 Esteban Grillo 104 Madrid Crecimiento de alcabalas en 1576 
12 04/03/1575 Esteban Grillo 17 Flandes Crecimiento de alcabalas en 1576 
13 05/03/1575 Lorenzo Lomelín  en 
nombre de Nicolao y 
Agustin Lomelin  
107 4 galeras y Besançon Alcabalas de 1576 y otras 
14 14/03/1575 Esteban Grillo 133 Flandes Crecimiento de alcabalas 
15 19/03/1575 licenciado Miguel de 
Mena 
57 Madrid (feria de octubre 
de 1574) 
 
16 19/03/1575 Alonso de Salinas, por si 
y en nombre de lagunos 
vecinos de Burgos 
323 Flandes Crecimiento de alcabalas 
17 03/1575 Antonio Fucar y sobrinos 9 Alemania a don 
Francisco Hurtado de 
Mendoza, conde de 
Monteagudo, embajador 
ante el Emperador 
En letras de Alemania a Madrid 
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18 04/04/1575 Nicolas de Grimaldo 40   No se proveen, como se 
le deben se le pagan, la 
primera es una deuda 
que cobra en nombre de 
otros por unos sueldos 
de galeras 
Crecimiento de alcabalas 
19 11/04/1575 Juan Curiel de la Torre 212 Besançon y Madrid Crecimiento de alcabalas en 1576 
20 19/04/1575 Nicolas de Grimaldo 465 Flandes y otros 
banqueros Madrid 
Alcabalas de 1575 
21 14/05/1575 Nicolas de Grimaldo 154 Madrid (50) Génova 
(resto) 
Distintas personas y crecimiento de 
alcabalas de 1576 
22 25/05/1575 Esteban Lercaro y Pablo 
Sauri 
48 galeras España Crecimiento de alcabalas en 1576 
23 14/06/1575 Esteban Lercaro 16    Madrid (feria de octubre 
de 1574) 
Crecimiento de alcabalas en 1576 
24 08/07/1575 Juan Curiel de la Torre 587 Flandes Flota de indias, alcabalas 1576, 
concejos de Santiago, y se le dan 
8.615.384 mrs de juros los 6 
millones a 14.000 y el resto a 
20.000 en las salinas para gozas 
desde 24/6/1575 en adelante. Si no 
se le hubiere pagado la mitad en 
octubre de 1575, podría vender los 
juros contándoselos a él los de 
20.000 a 13.000, y los de 14 a 11. 
Se le dan otros 262.500 mrs de juro 
a 20 por resguardo y se le permite 
seguir conservando los juros de 
resguardo que aún tiene de otros 
asientos. 
25 23/07/1575 Nicolas de Grimaldo 107 Flandes flotas de 1575 
 
The total of the asientos is of 5,382.455 ducats. The some asientos that specified 
bankers’ payments in kind (galleys, mercury, with a total of about 560,000 ducats) are 
included.
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Direct revenues from customs and monopolies are put together under “Farms”. 
Revenues from the Indies are represented in actual numbers by points and in a 3-year 
moving average by a curve. The Millones are included in the servicios-for the years 
1591-1596. Amounts are in million ducats (nominal). 
 
Figure 1: Revenues 
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The amounts of the debt service are collected from different sources in the years that are 
represented by circles. The dates of the payment stops are marked by vertical lines.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Debt service and ordinary taxes (in million ducats) 
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Figure 3: Debt service and ordinary taxes (deflated and per capita) 
 
                       
Amounts are in million ducats (nominal).  
 
Figure 34: Other Revenues 
 
